Introduction
On 26 June 2008 the Australian minister for Veterans' Affairs, Alan Griffin, announced that 'Battle for Australia Day' would be commemorated on the first Wednesday in September; this proclamation fulfilled a Labor Party election promise and followed a ten-year campaign by returned soldiers and others to commemorate the battles that constituted the Pacific War. The very recent inauguration of this day enables an examination of the dynamics of the processes involved in the construction of national commemorations. The aim of this article is to identify the various agencies involved in the process of 'remembering the Battle for Australia' and the channels they have used to spread their message; to trace the political and historical controversies surrounding the notion of a 'Battle for Australia' and the conflicting narratives to which they have given rise; and to outline the 'chronopolitics,' the shifts in domestic and international politics that 'over time created the conditions for changes in the memoryscape and, sometimes, alterations in the heroic narrative as well ' (Gluck 2007: 61) .
The title of this article is intended to recall Jay Winter's insistence that the terms 'remembering' and 'remembrance' be used, rather than memory, in order to emphasise the active role of agents in the creation and perpetuation of memory and acts of commemoration (2006: 3) . Timothy Ashplant, Grant Dawson and Michael Roper, in a broad ranging study of war memory, emphasise the role of constituencies, or agents of remembrance in the process of memory formation and the struggle to articulate distinct and often competing memories in the array of arenas available. Agencies of articulation on Gallipoli' (Stanley 2008a: 246) . Adopted by James Bowen in a letter to the National President of the Returned and Services League of Australia (RSL) in 1997, it became the focus of the Battle for Australia Commemoration National Council, formed in 1998.
The problem, however, in using the expression 'Battle for Australia' is in knowing exactly what it covers. Does it refer simply to the period 1942-1943, the years when the Australian government mobilised the country under the apparent imminent threat of Japanese invasion? This is the period that most of the official commemorative speeches in September 2008 chose to highlight, and that James Bowen's 'The Battle for Australia, 1942 Australia, -1943 ' website also selects (Bowen 2001) . Or should the 'Battle for Australia' designate the years [1942] [1943] [1944] [1945] , from the fall of Singapore to the Japanese surrender, as the Battle for Australia Commemoration National Council proposes on its website (n.d.)? Martin Evans argues that remembered wars are those that tend to possess 'temporal coherence'; in other words, clear chronological boundaries mark their beginning and end (1997 (Ashplant et al., 2004: 53) . The significance of, and the reasons behind, the attribution of a single nomenclature-'Battle for Australia'-to a wide range of military engagements are explored in the rest of the article. 'Australian troops had, at Milne Bay, inflicted on the Japanese their first undoubted defeat on land ... some of us may forget that, of all the allies, it was the Australians who first broke the invincibility of the Japanese army.' These details, which draw attention to the crucial role that Australians played, and the casualties they suffered (Australian casualties were many times greater than those among US forces), help to explain the choice of this battle as the focus for commemorative activities. They also, perhaps, Rudd's defence of Curtin and of his demand to Churchill that the Australian troops be brought home to defend the country, demonstrates the continuity in the Labor Party's perspective on WWII; it is the logical extension of Keating's pilgrimage to the Kokoda Track in 1992.
Agencies and arenas of articulation
This political confrontation is explained in part by adherence to two strands of nationalism. An older form, linked to the commemoration of Gallipoli, has come to represent the original ties with Britain; this is paradoxical, one might think, since one strand of the Gallipoli legend suggests that ANZAC troops were betrayed by the incompetence and stupidity of British generals. To draw attention to the events of 1942, on the other hand, associated as they generally are with the fall of Singapore, the failure of British protection and Churchill's intransigence, is related to a partial rejection of Britain and its heritage, and the assertion of the right to make new alliances in the national interest, even though, again paradoxically, the new alliance both during and since WWII has been with that rather overwhelming ally, the USA. These ideological differences, which do not usually translate into clear strategic distinctions, should not be 
The limitations of communicative memory and oral history
The uneasy relationship between history and memory in the contemporary world is well illustrated in this debate. As Stanley emphasises, one of the primary sources for the widespread belief in the narrowly avoided invasion by the Japanese are the memories of those who lived through the war: 'A deep lode of family memories informs the popular 7 It is not the aim of this article to assess these divergent positions; nor is the author qualified to do so. These erroneous 'memories' illustrate the limitations of the vernacular, and of cultural memory and oral history. Oral history may reveal-as little else can-the lived, subjective experience of the participants, but its usefulness and its accuracy as a source of historical knowledge are questionable, not only because of the limited perspectives and knowledge of the participants but because of the extent to which memory is reformulated by the 'scripts which later generations form and disseminate about significant events in the past' (Winter 2006: 278) . Moreover, personal memory can be influenced both 'downstream' of the events it records, as 'scripts' re-write and overwrite original experience, and 'upstream' by existing narratives that provide the 'templates,' scripts, frames or schema through which experience is understood.
PORTAL
Ashplant et al. suggest that individual subjects represent their experiences, even the eyewitness memory of war, 'through the pre-existing narratives fashioned by the agencies of the nation-state and civil society' (Ashplant et al. 2004: 33) , but also, I might add, pre-war period (Walker 1999; Stanley 2008a) . It is not nowadays well rememberedand this is a striking lacuna in memories of World War II-that a strongly hierarchical view of race was the dominant ideology before and during the war years, and that the 'claim of effective proprietorship over the continent' for the British race was not felt to be secure (Day 2005: 237) . My own research into the relations between Australia and New Caledonia has revealed the extent of the concern in Australia throughout the 1930s that their near neighbour might provide the launching pad for a Japanese attack.
Conclusion
Pierre Nora (1989) identifies a tendency in the contemporary world for cultural memories to challenge, dictate to and even replace history. Certainly the debate over the Battle for Australia has been characterised in part by the confrontation between those claiming fidelity to memory and the defenders of historical method: on the one hand, the evocation of lived experience; on the other, the more dispassionate analyses of Japanese strategic planning. Should a truce be declared in the 'war' between history and memory? Jay Winter proposes that they be viewed as 'describing a field of force in social thought and social action ' (2006: 288) . Therefore, through the 'creative engagement' of those outside and within the academy we might arrive at a public history in the field of remembrance that recognises the complexity of the interaction of subjective experience, official record and historical research.
Perhaps the closest expression that exists of a 'public history' of 1942 is the article that appears on the Australian War Memorial website. Under the heading 'Australia Under Attack, 1942 Attack, -1943 ' and the subheading 'The Battle for Australia,' it covers the twoyear period by treading a subtle line between recognition of the widespread belief in the imminence of invasion and the historical assessments of its improbability:
The attacks on Australia in early 1942 had created the belief that invasion was imminent. Allied victories in the second half of 1942, in the Coral Sea, around Midway Island, at Milne Bay, at Guadalcanal and on the Kokoda Trail, halted the advance of Japanese forces in the South-West Pacific Area. Although the Japanese high command realised that an invasion of the Australian mainland was impossible as early as March 1942, continuing air attacks on northern Australia and enemy naval activity off the east and west coasts encouraged Australians to believe that the threat persisted.
The Australian civilian population, encouraged to maintain a high state of alert and starved of detailed information on the state of the war, fell victim to rumours. Many believed, wrongly as it turned out, that a plan-the Brisbane Line-existed to abandon the north and west of the continent to the enemy in the event of invasion and only commit to the defence of the most populated areas of south-eastern Australia. There was no such plan.
By mid-1943 Allied victories in the South-West Pacific Area reassured many Australians that the threat of invasion had passed. (Australia Under Attack 2010) As the quote demonstrates, the article leaves ambiguous the legitimacy of the public belief in an imminent Japanese invasion and the responsibility for it: was it simply the attacks by the Japanese that created it? What was the role of Curtin and the government in 'encouraging' this belief? In 'forgetting' the areas of disagreement in order to arrive at an anodyne document on which all could agree, there lies perhaps the risk of draining the life from national debate in a way that Winter probably would not endorse. More broadly, Ryan's article reveals its rootedness in the 'old nationalism' when Australian identity was principally derived from belonging to the 'British race' and occupying a place within the British Empire. This explains his endorsement of the legacy of Gallipoli, his reference to Australia's delusions of independence and selfimportance enshrined in the myth of the battle for Australia, and his opinion that Curtin was 'desperately distraught' when he 'loosely' referred to a 'Battle for Australia,' the implication being, of course, that Curtin's demand to Churchill that Australian troops return to defend their country was an unjustified, indeed hysterical, over-reaction. These familiar themes have characterised both the political and the historical debate over the 'Battle for Australia' for the last ten years, a debate that is clearly far from over.
The virulence with which the debate has been pursued, the ad hominem attacks, suggest just how much is at stake in the interpretation of the war legacy as it passes into cultural memory and becomes increasingly reliant for transmission on public institutions such as schools, the academy, museums and state-organised commemorative activities.
Moreover, the virulence and attacks confirm the extent to which the officially sanctioned narrative of Australian national identity is still associated with military feats. (Lake & Reynolds 2010: vii) . It remains to be seen, however, whether public enthusiasm for Battle for Australia Day will carry the same emotional charge as Gallipoli and whether a change in 'chronopolitics'-the future return to power of a Federal Coalition government for example-will see the day relegated to the sidelines of official commemoration.
